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"Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed
by the use of eavesdropping devices."'

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 22, 2002, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee released an
extraordinary document. The committee had received a judicial opinion written

by the highly secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, conferred May 2003; B.B.A., Abilene
Christian University, 1984.
1. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
2. James Bamford, At Least Kalka Supplied a Lawyer, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 1,2002, at E3.
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committee made the secret court's opinion public.3 The disclosure was
unprecedented. 4 The FISC's Memorandum Opinion5 was issued in response to
the U.S. Department of Justice's new procedures for conducting electronic
surveillance as authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).6
In an en banc decision, the FISC rejected part of the Justice Department's new
guidelines for conducting FISA investigations and replaced those guidelines with
its own. 7 In doing so, the secret court rejected the government's interpretation of
a new law amending the language of the FISA. 8
Following the FISC's May 17 Opinion, the Justice Department applied for a
FISA electronic surveillance order, requesting that the order be granted under the
Department's own proposed guidelines. 9 On July 24, 2002, the court granted the
government's application but again rejected the new guidelines and modified the
order consistent with its May 17 Opinion.'0
The Department of Justice viewed the FISC's decision as a denial and
appealed to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review."
In its first decision since its inception, 2 the reviewing court reversed the lower
court, finding that there was not an adequate basis for the FISC's interpretation of
both FISA and the recent amendment to FISA. 3
This note proposes that the FISC was correct in its interpretation of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the amendment created by the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (U.S.A. PATRIOT Act). It also offers that the FISC
decision, which did not reach a constitutional issue, should have been affirmed in
review because it reinforced the individual rights and privacy protections offered
by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution while still allowing the
federal government to use stronger measures to combat foreign espionage and
terrorism.

3. Id.
4. See id. (stating this was only the second open opinion released by the FISC in twenty-five years).
5. Memorandum Opinion, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (May 17, 2002), at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa [hereinafter May 17 Opinion] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (2002),
rev'd per curiam sub nom In re Sealed Case, 3 10 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
2002) (per curiam).
6. Bamford, supra note 2.
7. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 625-27; Brief for the United States at 3, 6-9, In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d 717 (No. 02-001) available at http://fas. org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/082102appeal.html (last visited June
13, 2003) [hereinafter Government Brief] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 615 n.2; Government Brief, supra note 7, at 6-9.
9. Government Brief, supra note 7, at 3, 6-9.
10. Id.
I.
Id. at 3.
12. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 26, 719.
13. Id. at 721,746.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Origin of the FISA
The scandals and abuses of the Nixon Administration gave birth to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.14 President Richard Nixon
interpreted broadly his executive power to conduct domestic surveillance. 5
Under the guise of protecting national security, the President's office authorized
surveillance of Reverend Martin Luther King, citing that King had contacts with
suspected communists. After the break-in of the Watergate Hotel, the subsequent
cover-up, and other White House-related scandals came to light, 7 Congress sought
to reign in the Chief Executive's power to conduct surveillance. Congress,
seeking to balance the Executive Branch's legitimate duty to protect the nation
from foreign threats with the need to uphold important freedoms and individual
privacy, passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.'9
B. The FISC and the Application Process
Under Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, Congress has
the authority to establish inferior courts. ° Through the FISA, Congress created
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for the purpose of reviewing the
Executive Branch's applications to conduct domestic surveillance for foreign
intelligence gathering." The FISA authorizes the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme

14. See Robert A. Dawson, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1382-83, 1386-87 (1993)
(discussing how Presidents, prior to FISA, claimed to have the inherent power to conduct warrantless searches if
they were conducted in the interest of national security).
15. See id. at 1386, 1429 n.37 (listing examples of domestic surveillance initiated by President Nixon).
16. Id. at 1429 n.37.
17. See id. at 1386, 1429 n.37 (noting Nixon's abuse of surveillance during this period).
18. See ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977) [hereinafter FISA Hearings] (stating
that, under the FISA, "[tihe courts, not the executive, ultimately rule on whether the surveillance should occur,"
and stating that the FISA "prevent[s] the National Security Agency from randomly wiretapping American
citizens whose names just happen to be on a watch list of civil rights and antiwar activists").
19. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
21. Dawson, supra note 14, at 1387-89 (discussing the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court through the FISA); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2003) (defining foreign intelligence). Section
1801(e) defines Foreign Intelligence as:
(1)information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the
ability of the United States to protect against-(A) actual or potential attack or other grave
hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage or international
terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (C) clandestine intelligence
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign
power; or (2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to,
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Court to appoint the eleven-member panel of the FISC from sitting district court
judges. 22 The FISC meets in secret and government petitions are heard in secret. 2'
In fact, the government is the only party present at a FISA hearing. 4 No opposing
attorneys appear before the FISA and the FISC's opinions are almost never
published)4
When a government agent wishes to conduct a FISA search or
• surveillance,
26
the agent works with a government lawyer to draft the application. Both the
lawyer and the agent sign the application and it is presented to the head of the
appropriate intelligence agency.27 This officer certifies that the order is sought for
foreign intelligence purposes only.8 Before it is presented to the FISC, the
application passes to the Attorney General, who also certifies that it meets the
requirements of the law. 9
If the government's application establishes probable cause sufficient to issue a
surveillance order, the FISC issues the order)0 Under the FISA, the "probable
cause" threshold the government must meet is probable cause to believe the target
of the investigation is a "foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."'" Under the
law as originally enacted, the scope of any FISA surveillance order was limited to
investigations where the purpose was the gathering of foreign intelligence."
C. The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act of 2001
The horrific acts perpetrated against the United 33States on September 11,
2001, prompted a swift reaction by the U.S. Congress. Following the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, legislators expressed frustration with
the failures of intelligence agencies and law enforcement to piece together clues

and if concerning a United States person is necessary to-(A) the national defense or the
security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
Id.

22. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2003).
23. Bamford, supra note 2; Helen E. Schwartz, Oversight of Minimization Compliance Under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs Are Doing Their Jobs, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 436
(1981) (noting that "[tlhe FISA court sits in secret sessions").
24. Bamford, supra note 2.
25. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 436 (stating that the court "holds no adversary hearings, and publicly
issues no opinions or reports").
26. JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE 317-18 (Simon & Schuster 1996).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2003).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (1991).
33. See Michael T. McCarthy, U.S.A. PATRIOTAct, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 438-39 (2002) (noting
that the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act was signed less than six weeks after the attacks).
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of the danger prior to September 11.4 U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft
requested that Congress grant the Justice Department greater power to prevent
future terrorist acts." Within six weeks of the attacks, Congress passed the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (U.S.A. PATRIOT Act).36
The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act is a voluminous document 37 that makes numerous
amendments to existing law including the FISA.3" As originally enacted, a FISA
surveillance order stated that "the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information."39 The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act changed that requirement
by adding the word "significant."0 A FISA order now requires that a "significant
purpose of the surveillance" be for obtaining foreign intelligence.4 , Under the

new law, a Justice Department official no longer has to demonstrate to the FISC
that the primary purpose of the surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence.
Rather, the officer need only show that the collection of foreign intelligence is a
"significant"11 purpose for requesting the order.42
D. The Justice Department's "Minimization Procedures"

On March 6, 2002, the Attorney General circulated a memorandum
promulgating new procedures for the different Justice Department executives to
43
follow in regard to foreign intelligence surveillance. Specifically, the memo
dealt with what the FISA refers to as "minimization procedures."" The
minimization procedures dictate to the Department who may direct a FISA

34. See id. at 437-38 (noting that prior to September 11,the Central Intelligence Agency had intelligence
on two of the hijackers, identifying them as suspected terrorists, but the Agency failed to share that information
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Immigration and Naturalization Service in time for them to prevent
the hijackers from entering the country).
35. Id. at 438-39.
36. Id. at 439.
37. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. PATRIOT Act of 2001), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered
titles of U.S.C.).
38. See Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 968-74 (2002) (listing some of the amendments created by FISA).
39. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (a)(7)(B) (1991) (emphasis added).
40. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (a)(7)(B) (2003).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611,
615-16 (2002).
44. Id.; see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1)(2003) (defining "minimization procedures" as:
specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably
designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information
concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to
obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.).
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investigation." The FISC retains authority to approve of measures "affecting the
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information obtained through
electronic surveillances and physical searches of U.S. persons to be approved as
part of the government's applications" for a FISA surveillance order., 6 Specifically,
the "minimization procedures are designed to regulate" such interaction between
"FBI counterintelligence and counter terrorism officials on one hand, and FBI
criminal investigators, trial attorneys in the Justice Department's Criminal
Division, and U.S. Attorney's Offices on the other hand."47
The new procedures outlined in the March memorandum reflected the
Attorney General's interpretation of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act's amendment to
FISA. 48 According to this interpretation, the Act "allows FISA to be used
primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign
intelligence purpose remains.' 49 The Justice Department interprets the changes
made by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act as giving federal law enforcement agents the
authority to advise or make recommendations to intelligence officials conducting
FISA surveillance. °
III. THE FISC's MAY 17 DECISION
The FISC rejected part of the government's new procedures. The court found
that allowing criminal prosecutors to advise intelligence officials on FISA
surveillances effectively authorized the collection "of evidence for law
enforcement purposes, instead of' foreign intelligence purposes.5 The FISC
viewed these provisions as a means of substituting Title III surveillance orders
with the FISA surveillance orders.52 The court envisioned criminal prosecutors
who are unable to establish probable cause in order to obtain an electronic
surveillance order under Title III directing FBI intelligence officials on the
initiation, operation, continuation or expansion of FISA surveillances and
searches.53 The FISC emphasized that foreign intelligence gathering is the

45. Brief on Behalf of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, at 3. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 2002) (No. 02-001), available at http://fas.org/irp//
agency/doj/fisa/091902FISCRbrief.pdf (last visited June 13, 2003) [hereinafter ACLU Brief] (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
46. In reAll Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
47. Id. at615-16.
48. Government Brief, supra note 7.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id.
51. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
52. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2001). The Title III Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (Title III) is the federal law governing the use of electronic surveillance for the purpose of law
enforcement. Under Title III, an order for a wiretap can only be obtained when federal law enforcement can
show a federal judge that "there is probable cause to believe that an individual is committing ... or is about to
commit a particular offense ....
Id.
53. In reAll Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
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"raison d'etre" for the FISA as opposed to investigations for the purpose of
criminal prosecution.-4
The court placed limits on the extent to which law enforcement officials may
advise foreign intelligence officers. It ruled that "law enforcement officials shall
not make recommendations to intelligence officials concerning the initiation,
operation, continuation or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances." 5 The
FISC also required that FBI and criminal prosecutors "ensure ... that advice
intended to preserve the option of a criminal prosecution does not inadvertently
using
result in the Criminal Division's directing or controlling the investigation
''16
objectives.
enforcement
law
toward
surveillances
and
FISA searches
In its reversal of the memorandum opinion, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review determined that the FISC had no legal basis for
requiring a separation between foreign intelligence operations and law enforcement
operations." The three-judge appellate panel determined that, because the purpose
of the FISA is to guard the nation against foreign spies and terrorists, the Justice
Department's guidelines are constitutionally reasonable, even if they do not meet
Fourth Amendment warrant standards.58
IV. DISCUSSION

The concerns that generated the passage of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act
involved the coordination, consultation and information-sharing between
intelligence and law enforcement officials." The Justice Department's
minimization procedures beg the question: Did Congress, by amending the FISA,
contemplate the authorization of electronic surveillance where the primary or
exclusive purpose is la enforcement? ° The FISC wisely did not interpret the
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act as permitting such an expansion of the government's
highly intrusive surveillance power." The court did approve the government's
proposed procedures allowing the FBI to disseminate to law enforcement officers
and prosecutors information collected by intelligence officers. 6' This type of
54. Id. at 613.
55. Id. at 625.
56. Id.
57. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 721 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 2002) (per
curiam).
58. Id. at 746.
59. See McCarthy, supra note 33, at 437-39 (discussing the circumstances leading to the passage of the
Act).
60. See ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 25-26 (asserting that investigations primarily or exclusively
conducted for law enforcement purposes must comply with the Fourth Amendment); Government Brief, supra
note 7, at 10 (claiming that only a "significant non-law enforcement purpose" is required to conduct an
investigation).
61. See In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 615 n.2 (declining to determine if the amendment
authorizes investigations "primarily for law enforcement purposes").
62. Id. at 625.
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information-sharing would be in keeping with the spirit of the U.S.A. PATRIOT
Act. The Act contemplates "essentially unlimited sharing of information between
intelligence and law enforcement" officials.63 However, Congress did not necessarily
alter the probable cause standard controlling when criminal investigators may use
electronic surveillance. 64
A. The Government's Interpretationof the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act Amendment
The federal government argues that its March 2002 procedures conform to
the new statutory language of the FISA as provided by the U.S.A. PATRIOT
Act. 65 The government points out that the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act allows FISA
surveillance where the FISC determines that foreign intelligence gathering is a
"significant purpose." 66 It interprets this amendment as allowing the "FISA to be
used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign
intelligence purpose remains." 67
The government states that under the FISA's definition of "[fjoreign
intelligence information," 68 any information "relevant or necessary to help the
United States protect against certain specified threats, including attack, sabotage,
terrorism, and espionage committee [sic] by foreign powers or their agents"
would qualify under FISA. 69 It further argues that information gathered for the
purpose of prosecuting a foreign spy or terrorist would fall within the definition
if such a prosecution "[p]rotects against espionage or terrorism."7 ° The Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution would not be implicated, the government
stresses, if the government's purpose is to protect national security.7'
The most persuasive argument offered by the government supporting the idea
that protecting national security includes criminal prosecution is that prosecutions
can lead to the gathering of more critical foreign intelligence information." Such
prosecutions are best exemplified by the cases of Ahmed Ressam and Robert
Hanssen.73 After he was arrested entering the country from Canada, the government

63. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 5.
64. Cf id. (suggesting the "distinction between surveillance authorization for criminal ... and intelligence
investigations" had been preserved).
65. See generally Government Brief, supra note 7 (arguing against the FISC's rejection of the new
guidelines).
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id.
68. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2003).
69. See Government Brief, supra note 7, at 12 (distinguishing foreign intelligence information from
"information concerning purely domestic threats," like that posed by Timothy McVeigh's plan to blow up the
federal building in Oklahoma City).
70. See id. at 13 (stating that "[pirosecution is often a most effective means of protecting national
security").
71, Id. at 10.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id.
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charged Ressam, the so-called "millennium bomber," with attempting to destroy
Los Angeles International Airport. 74 Subsequent to his conviction and sentencing,
Ressam provided the government with information regarding his training at an
overseas al-Qaeda training camp. 75
Hanssen, a 27-year veteran agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was
arrested and charged with passing intelligence information to the former Soviet
Union.76 His prosecution, the government argues, led to the acquisition of vital
information about his years of espionage activities and vulnerabilities within the
Bureau. 7
The Justice Department concedes that it may not use the FISA for the exclusive
purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of a domestic crime, such as
7
homicide, because such information is not "foreign intelligence information. 1
However, if the investigation aims to acquire evidence to prosecute the target for
espionage or terrorism, the purpose would be classified as gathering foreign
intelligence information and should be allowed under the FISA. 79
B. Electronic Surveillance: The FourthAmendment, Title III and the FISA
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.'8
In short, "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."'" Since
the drafting of the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to
determine what government actions do and do not constitute a search, triggering

74. See Victor Ostrowidzki, Anti-Terrorist ProgramCriticizedas Incoherent, SEATtLE POST-INTEIGENCER,
Dec. 26, 2000, at Al (stating that Ressam, an Algerian national, was accused of smuggling a bomb into a Washington
State port and of being part of a conspiracy to violently disrupt millennium celebrations across the United States).
75. Government Brief, supra note 7, at 13.
76. Good Morning America: FBI Veteran Arrested for Spying for Russia (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 20, 2001) (transcript on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
77. See Government Brief, supra note 7, at 13 (stating that Hanssen himself was the best source of
intelligence information on his spying and that it was only attained through his prosecution and conviction).
78. See id. at 17 (stating that if such information concerning domestic crimes is uncovered while
gathering foreign intelligence, it may be disseminated to prosecutors under existing minimization procedures).
79. Id.
80.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

81. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330
(2001) (stating that the Fourth Amendment was "designed to control conduct of law enforcement officers that
may significantly intrude upon privacy interests").

2003 / The ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Court's May 17 Opinion
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The seminal case regarding the use of
electronic listening devices is Katz v. United States. 2 In Katz, the Supreme Court
recognized that the use of electronic surveillance does indeed constitute a search
and is subject to the Fourth Amendment's inherent privacy protection." The
government is required to show probable cause before a warrant to conduct
electronic surveillance can be issued.8 4
After Katz was decided, the U.S. Congress passed Title III, the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus Act).85 Title III dictates the
requirements the federal government must follow when it conducts electronic
surveillance for the purposes of criminal investigation. 6 Under the Omnibus Act,
a federal judge must first find that there is probable cause to believe a crime has
been or is about to be committed before an electronic surveillance order may be
issued. 87 This requirement of probable cause adheres to Fourth Amendment
dictates." The purpose of Title III is to allow the government to engage in more
effective crime fighting measures while maintaining the constitutionally mandated
privacy protection of innocent citizens."
The government can acquire a Title III electronic surveillance order to
investigate such crimes as espionage, sabotage, treason, aircraft hijacking and
piracy, crimes related to the destruction of aircraft, hostage taking, sabotage of a
nuclear facility or fuel facility, crimes relating to the use of biological weapons,
and even visa and passport violations. 9° Most acts of terrorism are included
within the scope of Title 111. 9' In fact, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act added seven
additional terrorism-type offenses under which a Title III electronic surveillance
order may be issued.9' The fact that the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act added more
terrorism-related offenses to Title III would indicate that Congress intended for
the Omnibus Act to continue to control law enforcement's use of electronic
surveillance for the purposes of investigating terrorism and espionage offenses
for criminal prosecution. 93

82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 7.
83. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 7.
84. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358-59.
85. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 7-8.
86. Id. at 8.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000); ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 8.
88. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 8.
89. Id. at 8; United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972).
90. ACLU Brief, supra note 41-45, at 8-9.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 9; see United and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub L. 107-56, § 201, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001) (adding
"any criminal violation of section 229 [of Title 18] (relating to chemical weapons); or sections 2332, 2332a,
2332b, 2339A, or 2339B ... (relating to terrorism)").
93. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 10.
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The FISC, in its May 17 opinion, anticipated that under the Department of
Justice's March 2002 memorandum, federal law enforcement officers and
criminal prosecutors would avoid the stricter probable cause requirements of
Title III and instead use the FISA in order to conduct criminal investigations]7
Thus, law enforcement officers would be able to conduct electronic surveillance
for criminal prosecutions while avoiding having to show that there is probable
cause of criminal conduct.9 Under the government's interpretation, law
enforcement officers would simply show the FISC that there is some foreign
intelligence gathering purpose to what would otherwise be a criminal investigation.9
Such an interpretation of the FISA is not only antithetical to the purposes behind
Title III, FISA and the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, but it also implicates the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 97 Title III's higher threshold for probable
cause must dictate the government's use of electronic surveillance for the
purpose of criminal prosecution.
Congress has provided two separate statutory means by which the government
may conduct electronic surveillance: Title III for prosecuting crimes and the
FISA for maintaining national security. 9 Recognizing that the use of electronic
surveillance for the purpose of prosecuting crimes triggers Fourth Amendment
protections, 99 Congress required judicial oversight as well as a showing of
probable cause of criminal activity before a Title III surveillance order could be
issued. i ° The Department of Justice's interpretation of the FISA as amended by
the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act has the effect of allowing the government to gather
criminal evidence using electronic surveillance while bypassing the probable
cause demands of Title III and the protections flowing from the Fourth
Amendment.'c°
Although a FISA surveillance order still requires judicial oversight,'10 it is
unclear what would constitute the requisite showing of probable cause that a
surveillance target is an agent of a foreign power. 103 The FISC almost never
publishes its decisions, so there is no publicly accessible record to help in
understanding precedent.'ta Would it be adequate probable cause if the subject
were an immigrant or entered the country with a visa? What if he or she were a

94. See supra Part III (reviewing the court's concerns).
95. See supra Part Ill.
96. Supra Part .C.
97. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 6, 37.
98. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 12.
99. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000).
101. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Department of Justice's interpretation of the FISA as amended
by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act).
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(2) (2003).
103. See id. § 1805(b) (stating that, in determining whether probable cause exists, "a judge may consider
past activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to current or future activities.").
104. Supra Part II.B.
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citizen holding a foreign passport or if his or her business involved importing or
exporting goods? Would there be sufficient probable cause if the target had
placed or received a number of overseas phone calls? Under the government's
interpretation of the FISA amendments, the Justice Department would be able to
conduct criminal investigations as long as some element involving foreign
intelligence existed, and without any showing of criminal behavior. 15
The government's interpretation of the FISA amendment poses serious
Fourth Amendment problems and the FISC rightly took a more narrow approach
to the new language, thus steering clear of the constitutional questions posed by
the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act.'
When a court chooses between two possible
interpretations of a statute, it must adopt the interpretation that avoids a constitutional
issue.o'
C. The Significance of "Significant"
As discussed above, the FISA was enacted as a compromise between the
inherent power of the Executive Branch to conduct surveillance of a person in the
°
interest of national security and the constitutional rights of that individual.'O
As
originally enacted, the FISA required that the purpose of such an investigation be
the collection of foreign intelligence. ' 9 This was an important safeguard to
ensure that the proper balance was struck between national security and civil
liberties. "10
However, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act allows for FISA electronic surveillance
orders when a significant purpose of the investigation is related to gathering
foreign intelligence." This change should not necessarily expand the scope of
the FISA to include investigations in which criminal prosecution is the primary
purpose, and the FISC correctly refused to adopt such a broad interpretation of
the amendment."'

105.

Supra Part IV.A.

106.

Supra Part III, IV; see also ACLU Brief, supra note 45 at 3, 24, 36-37 (highlighting constitutional

shortcomings of the government's U.S.A. PATRIOT Act interpretation).
107. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002) (describing the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, stating that "when a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the
latter." (quoting United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909))).
108.

Supra Part II.A.

109. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (reviewing the original FISA legislation).
110. See Dawson, supra note 14, at 1380 (quoting President Jimmy Carter concerning the FISA saying,
"one of the most difficult tasks in a free society like our own is the correlation between adequate intelligence to
guarantee our nation's security on the one hand, and the preservation of basic human rights on the other.").
11.

112.

Supra Part II.C.

See supra notes 64, 68, 69 and accompanying text (discussing concerns regarding the government's

interpretation of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the FISC's corresponding response).
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Congress amended the FISA in order to address two concerns: FISA
authorizations and the coordination and cooperation between intelligence
officials and law enforcement officials." 3 The U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) addressed these concerns in a report issued in July of 2001.114 The GAO
report describes the confusion and conflicting concerns between intelligence and
law enforcement." 5 Law enforcement officers were very interested in getting
criminal evidence discovered during FISA electronic surveillance operations."'
However, intelligence officers were wary of providing such evidence to law
enforcement." 7 They feared that if intelligence officials turned over criminal
evidence to law enforcement officers, the FISC would reject an application for
renewal of the surveillance order because the purpose for the order was no longer
primarily for foreign intelligence gathering." 8 Law enforcement officials stated
that the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy Review had interpreted the
"primary purpose" test of a FISA application to mean foreign intelligence
gathering should be the "exclusive" purpose for a FISA order. "9
Congress responded to these problems of information sharing by enacting the
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act."o The amended language-changing "the purpose" to
"significant purpose"--clarifies that an application to renew a surveillance order
does not have to be rejected simply because criminal prosecution becomes one of
the government's purposes during an ongoing investigation. 2' However, in a
hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, senators confirmed that the
amendments to the FISA were not intended to allow law enforcement to become
22
the primary purpose of FISA orders.

113. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 728-29, 732 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review 2002) (per curiam) (explaining that changes Congress made relaxed the requirements for FISA
authorization).
114. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNING OFFICE, FBI INTELIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: COORDINATION WITHIN JUSTICE
ON COUNTERNIEIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS IS LIMT,
GAO-01-780 (2001), at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items.do1780.pdf (last visited June 13, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
115. Id. at 4, 23, 30-31.
116. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 17.
117. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 114, at 11-12.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 14.
120. Supra Part II.C.
121. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 18.
122. See id. at 19 (gathering quotes from members of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 2002 FISA
Hearings-statement of Sen. Patrick Lehey: "[I]t was not the intent of these amendments to fundamentally
change FISA from a foreign intelligence tool into a criminal law enforcement tool"; statement of Sen. Diane
Feinstein: "I don't believe any of us ever thought that the answer to the problem was to merge Title III and
FISA"; Statement of Sen. Arlen Specter: "The word 'significant' was added to make it a little easier for law
enforcement to have access to FISA material, but not to make law enforcement the primary purpose").
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The "significant purpose" language was not the only amendment to the FISA
created by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act also authorizes
increased coordination and information sharing between criminal law
investigators and intelligence personnel. 23 This FISA Amendment, entitled
"Coordination with Law Enforcement," (coordination amendment) provides as
follows:
(1)

Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire
foreign intelligence information under this title may consult with
Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate
or protect against
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.

(2)

Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not preclude the
certification required by section 1104(a)(7)(B) of this title or the
entry of an order under section 1105 of this title. " 4

This language suggests that intelligence officers, not law enforcement
officers, are directing the FISA electronic surveillance investigations.',, It is
federal officers conducting surveillance "to acquire foreign intelligence information"
who are to consult and coordinate with law enforcement personnel.' 2' This
amendment would not appear to suggest that law enforcement officers would be
allowed to direct FISA investigations for the purposes of criminal prosecutions.
The FISC reached a similar conclusion by interpreting the minimization
procedures of the FISA. 11 It stated that "law enforcement officials shall not make
recommendations to intelligence officials concerning the initiation, operation,
continuation or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances."'' 28 This is
"consistent with FISA's new 'significant purpose' language ... and the entire
29
statutory scheme for surveillance authorization under Title III and FISA."'

123. Id. at 20.
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k) (2003) (added by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act).
125. Id. § 1806(k)(1) (per curiam). But see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734 (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review 2002) (claiming that Congress has not specified who may direct and control a
FISA investigation).
126. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1).
127. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 61l, 62526 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 2002).
128. Id. at 625 (revising the Justice Department's minimization procedures).
129. ACLU Brief, supra note 45, at 5 (reviewing the FISC's decision). But see In re Sealed Case, 310
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D. The "Special Needs" Argument
The Department of Justice argued that it may depart from ordinary Fourth
Amendment standards when there is "a 'special' interest concerning a particular
type of crime," and "crimes such as espionage and international terrorism"
qualify under the Constitution as "special.''3 The government relied on recent
U.S. Supreme Court cases to support the proposition that law enforcement may
fall under a "special needs" exception. 3 ' It argued that in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond,'32 the Court made clear that there are "special" law enforcement needs
that would allow for a more relaxed Fourth Amendment standard.'33 The
government arrived at this conclusion by noting that "the Court in Edmond
reviewed and approved prior decisions upholding special needs seizures
conducted for the purposes of capturing illegal immigrants and stopping
intoxicated motorists."' 4 The Court in Edmond approved of these warrantless and
suspicionless searches and seizures, despite the fact that "[s]ecuring the border
and apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities, and
law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit of
these goals."'35 Thus, the government concluded that a "general interest in crime
control"' 36 does not justify such searches and seizures, but that the prosecution of

spies and foreign terrorists
may "justify a departure from ordinary Fourth
37

Amendment standards."'

However, Justice O'Connor wrote, concerning the checkpoints in Edmond,
"the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning
' 8
what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose." 11
The Fourth Amendment still prohibits the government from conducting searches
without probable cause when the "primary purpose [is] to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing."'39 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment's constraints
on the government are greatest when the government is primarily pursuing a
general interest in crime control.' 4 Crimes such as espionage and terrorism do not

F.3d at 721 (stating that the FISC failed to support its conclusion with any reference to FISA language or
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act amendments).
130. See Government Brief, supra note 7, at 25-26 (claiming that espionage and foreign terrorism are
"special" crimes under the Constitution).
131. Id.
at 25.
132. 531 U.S. 32 (2002).
133. Government Brief, supra note 7, at 25.
134. Id. (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42).
135. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,42.
136. Id. at 44,
137. Government Brief, supra note 7, at 26.
138. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
139. Id. at 38; but see id. at 44 (stating in dicta, "the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit
an appropriately tailored road block set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous
criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.").
140. Id. at 38, 42.

2003 / The ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Court'sMay 17 Opinion
necessarily demand differing Fourth Amendment standards; the government's
primary purpose for investigation controls.14
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, Justice Scalia explained that "[a]
search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional... 'when special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable. '"1 43 More recently, in Ferguson v. City
of Charleston,44 the Supreme Court reviewed a public hospital's policy of testing
pregnant patients for drug use. 45 The hospital's policy included threats of
criminal prosecution as a means of coercing women into receiving treatment for
substance abuse.'46 The Court, striking down the hospital's policy, wrote in
response to a "special needs" argument, "[i]n other special needs cases, we
...tolerated suspension of the Fourth Amendment's warrant or probable-cause
requirement in part because there was no law enforcement purpose behind the
searches in those cases, and there was little, if any, entanglement with law
enforcement."'' 47 Concurring in the opinion, Justice Kennedy further explained,
"[t]he traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in our
previous cases on the explicit assumption that the evidence
obtained in the search
' 48
is not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
The FISC's May 17 opinion strikes a proper balance between the nation's
increased need for security against foreign terrorists and the privacy protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Congress passed the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act in response to the lack of
coordination between intelligence officers and law enforcement personnel.' 49 The
FISC's minimization procedures allow for greater cooperation and evidence
sharing, as contemplated by Congress.'5 At the same time, the secret court's
ruling recognizes that the raison d'etre for the FISA is foreign intelligence
gathering and not criminal evidence gathering.' 5 The government can always rely
141. Id.; see Abel v. United States, 362, U.S. 217, 219-20, 230-232, 234, 237-38, 241 (1960) (noting
that an espionage prosecution did not alter the legal considerations of the government's actions and
investigations preceding the prosecution); cf In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734 (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review 2002) (per curiam) (distinguishing protection against terrorism and espionage
directed by foreign powers from general crime control).
142. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
143. Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
144. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
145. Id. at 69-70.
146. Id. at 72.
147. Id. at 79 n.15.
148. Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
149. Supra Part IV.C.
150. Supra Part IV.C.
151. Supra Part Il1.
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on Title III orders to conduct surveillance where the primary purpose is criminal
prosecution.'52 Crimes such as occurred on September 11, 2001 are contemplated
within the scope of Title III surveillance orders, evidencing that Congress did not
contemplate the FISA as a law enforcement investigation mechanism for the
purpose of prosecuting foreign terrorism.'53 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
not acknowledged that the investigation of certain categories of crimes justifies the
government's use of a more relaxed standard than that of Fourth Amendment
probable cause."' By prohibiting prosecutors and law enforcement officers from
directing FISA electronic surveillances, the FISC decision reinforced the
difference between law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering and
avoided the constitutional issues regarding the Fourth Amendment.
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